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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
any impediment resulting from the Hagmann decision will not actual-
ly prolong the final distribution of the assets of an estate.
Criminal Law-STATUTORY IMMUNITY-USE OF TESTIMONY PROVIDED
PURSUANT TO FLORIDA IMMUNITY STATUTE PROHIBITED IN SUBSEQUENT
CRIMINAL OR CIVIL PROCEEDING INITIATED AGAINST DECLARANT BY
STATE.-Lurie v. Florida State Board of Dentistry, 288 So. 2d 223 (Fla.
1973).
Dr. Jack Lurie, a dentist, was compelled to testify before the Bre-
vard County Solicitor regarding alleged illegal transactions concerning
stolen automobiles.' One year later Lurie was informed against for re-
ceiving a stolen automobile and aiding in the concealment of stolen
property. He sought a writ of prohibition from the Fourth District
Court of Appeal contending that he was immune from criminal pros-
ecution under Florida's transactional immunity statute.2 The court
vent personal liability for claims, the prudent executor will not close the administra-
tion and distribute the assets until the nonclaim period has elapsed. J. DUKEMINIER & S.
JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRusTs, FuTuRE INTERESTS, AND ESTATE
PLANNING 83 (1972). Also, to prevent personal liability for his obligation to pay the estate
tax the executor should wait until the return has been audited and approved by the
government before he distributes the assets. Since the Internal Revenue Service is running
approximately one year behind schedule in its audits, id. at 83-84, the consideration of
post-death events in connection with the nonclaim statute will have no significant effect
on the time of final distribution of estate assets.
1. Arnold Rosenbaum was charged with possession of stolen property and making a
false statement on an application for an auto title certificate. His trial on the charges
resulted in a hung jury. In order to secure additional witnesses for the retrial, the as-
sistant county solicitor of Brevard County then subpoenaed Lurie and his son, who were
questioned under oath about their knowledge of Rosenbaum's activities and about the
elder Lurie's acquisition of two autos from Rosenbaum. State ex rel. Lurie v. Rosier, 226
So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
2. FLA. STAT. § 932.29 (1967) provided:
No person shall be excused from attending and testifying, or producing any
book, paper or other document before any court upon any investigation, proceeding
or trial, for a violation of any of the statutes of this state against bribery, burglary,
larceny, gaming or gambling, or of any of the statutes against the illegal sale of
spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, upon the ground or for the reason that the
testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to
convict him of a crime or to subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, but no person
shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
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agreed and granted the writ.8 Almost four years after his compelled
testimony was given, Lurie's license to practice dentistry was perma-
nently revoked by the Florida State Board of Dentistry in an administra-
tive proceeding.' The Board based its decision on incriminating state-
ments given by Lurie while testifying under the cloak of immunity.
Lurie petitioned the Fourth District Court of Appeal for a writ of
certiorari, contending that the administrative revocation of his license
was a "penalty or forfeiture" prohibited by the immunity statute. The
writ was denied per curiam without opinion.5 Lurie then successfully
sought a writ of certiorari from the Florida Supreme Court.6
In an opinion by Justice Ervin, the Florida Supreme Court stated
that for the immunity statute "[t]o be efficacious in securing testimony
of a citizen the immunity extended must be coextensive with all pos-
sible governmental penalties and forfeitures, criminal or civil."' Re-
instating this previously overruled interpretation of the immunity
statute," the court held that the action to revoke Lurie's license to prac-
any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may so testify or produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise, and no testimony so given or so produced shall
be received against him upon any criminal investigation or proceeding.
This section was renumbered and, in an amended form, is now found in FLA. STAT.
§ 914.04 (1973). The statute now applies to all crimes, not just the five mentioned above.
3. State ex rel. Lurie v. Rosier, 226 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969). The
court held that since the subject matter of the inquiry was larceny, one of the five
enumerated crimes under § 932.29, the immunity statute applied. Even though the crime
of receiving stolen property is not included within the category of larceny, once the im-
munity statute becomes applicable, the immunity extends to any transaction that the
witness was compelled to disclose when his testimony was responsive to questions which
are relevant to one of the five crimes. Id. at 826.
4. Lurie was charged with willful negligence and malpractice in the removal of a
tooth, and conspiracy and concealment of stolen automobiles. Pursuant to FLA. STAT.
§ 466.24 (1973), the Florida State Board of Dentistry suspended Lurie's license for one
year on the first count and permanently revoked his license on the second.
5. Lurie v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 264 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1972).
6. Lurie v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 288 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1973).
7. Id. at 226.
8. The court based its holding directly on the reinstatement of Florida State Bd. of
Architecture v. Seymour, 62 So. 2d I (Fla. 1952). Because Seymour reflected the position
of the supreme court at the time that Lurie was granted immunity, Lurie claimed that
the district court had given retroactive application to Headley v. Baron, 228 So. 2d 281
(Fla. 1969), which overruled Seymour and was decided while Lurie's case was pending in
the Fourth District.
Apparently accepting this contention, the supreme court granted Lurie's petition for
writ of certiorari based on a conflict with Florida Forest & Park Serv. v. Strickland, 18
So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1944), which held that where property or contract rights had been ob-
tained under one construction of a statute, those rights should not be destroyed by giving
retroactive application to a subsequent overruling case. The court held that Lurie en-
joyed a sufficient property right in his dental license to invoke the rule of Strickland.
288 So. 2d at 228.
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tice dentistry was a "penalty or forfeiture" within the meaning of
Florida statutes section 932.29. Therefore, the activities about which
Lurie testified while under a grant of immunity could not be used
against him in a subsequent administrative proceeding.9
An immunity statute enables the state to compel a witness to testify
about any matter, even though the testimony may be self-incriminat-
ing.10 Such statutes are a "legislative recognition of the extreme dif-
ficulty of proving certain types of crimes."" Immunity is granted pri-
marily in cases in which "the only persons capable of giving useful
testimony are those implicated in the crime.' 2 In exchange for the
witness' testimony, the fifth amendment requires that the government"
refrain from use of matters disclosed therein at a subsequent criminal
prosecution of the witness himself.' 4 Thus, an immunity grant obviates
the need for the privilege against self-incrimination, and, at the same
time, allows the government to obtain the testimony it needs.15
To satisfy constitutional requirements, however, the grant of im-
munity must be coextensive with the minimum protection provided by
the fifth amendment.16 Although subject to considerable criticism,' the
9. See 288 So. 2d at 226. Although the court did not state its holding explicitly, this
is clearly the intended result based on application of the holding in Seymour to the facts
of this case.
10. See Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading
the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1570 (1963).
11. Headley v. Baron, 228 So.'2d 281, 283 (Fla. 1969).
12. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972). "The crime usually involves
several suspects, none of whom could be effectively prosecuted unless at least one of [them]
can be induced" to accept immunity and testify against the others involved in the crime.
228 So. 2d at 284.
13. In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Supreme Court made the fifth amend-
ment binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment. Thus the Kastigar
standard is all that is constitutionally required.
14. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972).
15. The power to compel witnesses to testify is "[almong the necessary and most
important of the powers of the States as well as the Federal Government .... " Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93-94 (1964) (White, J., concurring); accord, Blair v.
United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919). The power "assure[s] the effective functioning of
government . .. [and compelled] testimony constitutes one of the Government's primary
sources of information." 378 U.S. at 93-94.
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a limitation on this power,
and has been zealously guarded by the courts. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
444-45 (1972). Immunity statutes "seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives
of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify."
Id. at 446. The protection of the immunity grant supplements that of the fifth amend-
ment by precluding the use of self-incriminating statements in a legal proceeding. See
Note, supra note 10, at 1570.
: 16. Kastigar y. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449 (1972); accord, Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 54 (1964); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892). See
also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896)
(upholding federal power to enact immunity statutes).
(Vol. 2
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recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Kastigar v.
United States"" delineated the minimum requirements for coextensive-
ness. It is now settled that the fifth amendment requires only that an
immunity statute prevent the use in any criminal case of both com-
pelled testimony and evidence derived directly or indirectly from that
testimony.19
The Florida immunity statute in two respects affords broader pro-
tection than is constitutionally required. First, the Florida statute pro-
vides transactional immunity: the state may not prosecute a witness for
any criminal activity disclosed by his testimony.20 Secondly, as a result of
Lurie, this transactional immunity extends to subsequent civil pro-
ceedings.
The statute was construed more narrowly by the Florida Supreme
Court in Headley v. Baron.21 In Headley a police officer was dismissed
from his job after giving testimony, under immunity, concerning a
bribery conspiracy. Rejecting the officer's claim that section 932.29
protected him against loss of his job, the court interpreted the phrase
"penalty and forfeiture" to relate only "to any penalty or forfeiture
which might arise out of or result from a conviction for one of the five
crimes named in the statute. 2 2 Since Headley was dismissed as the re-
sult of a subsequent civil proceeding, rather than a criminal prosecu-
tion, the "penalty" was not proscribed by the immunity statute.
The court in Headley expressly overruled its prior decision in Flor-
ida State Board of Architecture v. Seymour,23 which had construed the
same statute in a very similar situation.24 Seymour, an architect, testi-
17. See, e.g., Note, Use and Derivative Use Immunity: A Sufficient Substitute for
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 26 ARK. .. REV. 580 (1973); Note, Immunity
from Prosecution: Transactional Versus Testimonial or Use, 17 S.D.L. REv. 166 (1972);
Note, Immunity from Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment: An Analysis of Constitu-
tional Standards, 25 VAND. L. REv. 1207 (1972); Note, Kastigar v. United States: The
Required Scope of Immunity, 58 VA. L. REv. 1099 (1972); 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 394 (1973).
18. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
19. Id. at 453. "Use immunity" and "derivative use immunity" do not prevent sub-
sequent prosecution based on evidence obtained from legitimate independent sources. Id.
at 461. However, the burden is on the government "to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from" such an independent source. Id. at 460.
20. "Transactional immunity ... affords the witness considerably broader protection
than does the Fifth Amendment privilege." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453
(1972). This type of immunity "not only immunize[s] the witness for any use of his
testimony or the fruits thereof in a subsequent trial but it . . . also provide[s] absolute
immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates." Note,
Immunity from Prosecution: Transactional Versus Testimonial or Use, 17 S.D.L. REV. 166,
173 (1972). See also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892).
21. 228 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1969).
22. Id. at 286; see note 2 supra.
23. 62 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1952).
24. 228 So. 2d at 286.
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fled under immunity concerning his role in bribing public officials.
The supreme court agreed with Seymour's contention that the Board
of Architecture's license revocation procedure "effect[ed] a penalty or
forfeiture as contemplated by Section 932.29. '25 Unconcerned with the
nature of the proceeding,26 the court stated that the determinative in-
quiry "is whether or not a proceeding for revocation of an architect's
certificate amounts to a prosecution or may produce a penalty or forfei-
ture as contemplated by the statute. ' 27 Seizing upon the statute's use of
the disjunctive "or," the majority in Lurie reaffirmed Seymour and ob-
served that the immunity granted by section 932.29 is not divisible so
as to extend only to criminal prosecution.28 In overruling Headley, the
court noted that this broader interpretation of the statute comports
well with both legislative intent and fundamental fairness.29
Although the courts in several jurisdictions disagree,30 the result
25. 62 So. 2d at 3.
26. In Seymour the nature of the proceeding was irrelevant because FLA. STAT. § 838.08
(1941), as amended, (1973), specifically provided that compelled testimony concerning
bribery could not be admitted at any civil or criminal trial. See note 28 infra. However,
§ 838.08 was not involved in Lurie and was not relied on by the Lurie court in con-
cluding that testimony given pursuant to an immunity grant cannot be used at a sub-
sequent civil proceeding.
27. 62 So. 2d at 3 (emphasis added).
28. 288 So. 2d at 226. The court observed:
As Justice Terrell stated in Seymour . . .: "Whether the prosecution, penalty or
forfeiture has to do with a civil or criminal action is not material. The statute
[932.29, F.S.] makes it applicable to both."
Id., quoting from 62 So. 2d at 3.
The Seymour court, in the quoted passage, was referring to FLA. STAT. § 838.08 (1941),
concerning compelled testimony relating to bribery, not FLA. STAT. § 932.29 (1967). See
note 26 supra. Therefore, the quotation does not lend support in a strict legal sense to
the Lurie interpretation of § 932.29. But both the holding in Seymour and subsequent
readings of the case by Florida courts support the Lurie court's broad reading of the
immunity statute. The Seymour court based its holding primarily on § 932.29. See 62
So. 2d at 3. In State Beverage Dep't v. State ex rel. Zucker, 116 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1959), and Hotel & Restaurant Comm'n v. Zucker, 116 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1959), the Third District Court of Appeal extended the Seymour rationale to two
situations-revocation of liquor and motel operation licenses-that did not involve § 838.08.
Likewise in Headley, the supreme court interpreted Seymour on the basis of § 932.29,
failing to mention § 838.08. 228 So. 2d at 282.
29. "Such an interpretation is not a strained construction of the Legislature's en.
actment, but rather one which comports realistically and honestly with the professed
immunity grant." 288 So. 2d at 226. The court emphasized that state licensing agencies are
bound by the immunity grant since the prosecutor who is authorized to grant it acts
for the entire state government. Id.
The court also said:
Fundamental fairness dictates an open and aboveboard agreement between both
... the state and the witness. No hypocrisy or pretense can be indulged in by the
state to break so solemn a pledge when a witness is compelled by law to testify.
Id. at 227.
30. See, e.g., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Napolitano v. Ward, 457
(Vol. 2
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reached in Lurie is not without support.31 The statute is plainly sus-
ceptible of the interpretation given to it by the court.s2 Moreover, this
interpretation, although not constitutionally required, fully supports
the policy that an immunity grant should place the witness in sub-
stantially the same position as if he had invoked the fifth amendment
privilege.33 Had Lurie not been compelled to testify he could have in-
voked the privilege both in the prosecutor's office and at the administra-
tive proceeding;3 4 no penalty for that invocation could have been im-
posed.35 Only by extending immunity to the subsequent civil proceed-
ing could he have been placed in substantially the same position.86
By inquiring into the nature of the sanction to be imposed, rather
than the nature of the proceeding, the Florida Supreme Court has
adopted a sound framework for examining the proper scope of a grant
of immunity.3 7 The state, in granting immunity, professes to insulate
the witness from penalties or forfeitures resulting from his own testi-
F.2d 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1037 (1972); In re Schwarz, 282 N.E.2d
689 (Ill.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972); In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 147 N.Y.S.
713 (1917); West Virginia State Bar v. Graziani, 200 S.E.2d 353 (W. Va. 1973).
31. See Petition of Specter, 268 A.2d 104 (Pa. 1970); cf. Note, Self-Incrimination:
Privilege, Immunity, and Comment in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings, 72 MICH. L. Rav. 84,
111-12 (1973).
32. The language of § 932.29 employs conjunctions in two important places: "[N]o
person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or foreiture . . .and no [con-
pelled] testimony . . . shall be received against him upon any criminal investigation or
proceeding." (Emphasis added.) The reference to penalty or forfeiture is an alternative
to prosecution. The statute clearly prohibits criminal prosecution based upon compelled
testimony. Thus, the reference to "prosecution" encompasses any penalty or forfeiture re-
sulting from criminal prosecution, since only by adjudication of guilt can one be
criminally penalized. Since the statute prohibits any adjudication of guilt based on com-
pelled testimony, "penalty or forfeiture" must relate to other consequences. It seems im-
possible that one could be penalized as a consequence of a conviction that could never
occur. The only other sources of state sanctions, therefore, are civil and administrative
proceedings.
33. This policy objective was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
Kastigar. See 406 U.S. at 462.
34. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967).
35. See Nelson v. Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); cf. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70
(1973); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967);
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); State
ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 281 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973).
36. It is important to note that under either testimonial or use immunity, Lurie's
job would not have been protected by the Headley rationale since a proceeding to revoke
a license to practice dentistry is not a criminal proceeding designed to impose a criminal
penalty. Lurie could have retained his job after invoking the fifth amendment privilege
as long as the state did not exercise its power to compel him to testify. See cases cited in
note 35 supra. Thus, after the decision to compel Lurie to testify was made, the only
way in which the state could prevent Lurie from losing his job, based on this testimony,
would be to extend the immunity to civil proceedings.
37. See Note, supra note 10, at 1583.
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mony. It is well settled that some civil sanctions can be penal in na-
ture.8 Thus, if these penal sanctions are imposed in a civil proceeding
as a result of the witness' compelled testimony, the state's "solemn
pledge" is broken.39 Recognizing this potentiality, the witness is faced
with an impossible dilemma: he can refuse to testify and face contempt
charges or he can supply information which will result in a severe civil
sanction.4 0 But under the approach adopted by the supreme court, the
"criminal" or "civil" nature of the proceeding is irrelevant, and the
witness' dilemma is avoided. Those sanctions found penal in nature will
not be imposed in either proceeding.
Additionally, the court's broader interpretation of the immunity
statute should enhance the effectiveness of the immunity grant. The
purpose of the statute is to aid in securing evidence otherwise difficult
to obtain. 1 Implicit in the decision to grant immunity is the recogni-
tion that some criminals may not be prosecuted in order that prosecu-
tion of more significant criminal activity may proceed. Thus, by the
very nature of the process, the statute should encourage witnesses to
come forward and cooperate. As the Lurie court observed, "the state
• ..should not be technically 'sharp' or narrow in honoring its im-
munity commitment" because "[t]o do so would not only debilitate the
effectiveness of the immunity grant . . . [but] it would also invariably
serve to engender distrust for a state officer's promise."' 2 The Lurie
decision avoids this undesirable result by affording the witness the
broadest possible protection. The witness need no longer equivocate
in revealing incriminating facts because he fears subsequent prosecu-
tion; he can now testify fully and freely, disclosing all relevant informa-
tion. Witnesses who can provide prosecutors with useful information
now have a stronger incentive for seeking immunity in exchange for
that information." Particularly affected are those persons licensed and
regulated by governmental authorities. Under Lurie and Seymour
revocation of a governmental occupational privilege in a civil proceed-
38. See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n,
281 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973). See also Note, supra note 10, at 1584-86.
39. It must be noted that this agreement is based on a policy of fundamental fairness
between the state and the witness. See 288 So. 2d at 227. The state's promise is not con-
stitutionally required to extend so far. See notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text supra.
40. See Note, supra note 10, at 1584.
41. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
42. 288 So. 2d at 227.
43. There are some restrictions on the immunity grant. The witness obtains im-
munity only from crimes to which his testimony relates, and there must be a substantial
connection between the subject matter testified to and the crime for which immunity is
sought. See Note, supra note 10, at 1579. Also, a witness can be prosecuted for perjury
while testifying under immunity. Id. at 1580.
[Vol. 2
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ing based on compelled testimony is clearly a penalty or forfeiture pro-
hibited by the immunity statute.
On a policy level, however, the wisdom of the Lurie decision is not
beyond question. The broader immunity grant will prevent dismissal
of a state employee or a state-regulated professional on the basis of his
compelled testimony. As Justice Drew argued in dissent, the Lurie de-
cision therefore will allow a law enforcement officer to come before a
grand jury under immunity, "confess to participation in criminal ac-
tivities and then effectively bar suspension or removal from office and
thereafter... remain the symbol of the law.. . ."" To avoid this con-
sequence Justice Drew would adhere to the Headley construction of
the statute.4
5
But Justice Drew's hypothetical should be viewed as an inherent
risk of placing the immunity decision within prosecutorial discretion.
Under either the narrow or broad construction of the statute, the pros-
ecutor must determine whether immunity is warranted. Presumably
prosecutors will understand the consequences of granting immunity
and will consider both the state and the public interests in reaching
immunity decisions. 46 The possibility that, for example, a self-confessed
felon might remain in a position of trust is therefore a substantial fac-
tor that will be weighed by the prosecutor in balancing the need for
the witness' testimony against the harm to society that might result
should he be allowed to escape prosecution. 7 Thus the Lurie decision
might make prosecutors more cognizant of their responsibility to so-
ciety. Prior to Lurie a prosecutor granting immunity could rely on the
possibility of subsequent administrative action to provide an effective
alternative to criminal prosecution. With this option no longer avail-
able, he must be more diligent in assessing the burdens and benefits of
a particular immunity decision. Logically, this increased responsibility
could result in fewer, more selective immunity grants.48 Even so, the
immunity granted will more fully effectuate the purpose and policy of
44. 288 So. 2d at 233 (Drew, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 229. Justice Drew was a member of the majority which decided the over-
ruled Headley case.
46. 288 So. 2d at 227. See Note, Immunity from Prosecution and the Fifth Amend-
ment: An Analysis of Constitutional Standards, 25 VAND. L. RLv. 1207, 1212 (1972).
47. See Note, supra note 46, at 1212; Note, supra note 31, at 111-12.
48. This is not necessarily so, however. Since the crucial factor in the immunity de-
cision is the relative importance of the information sought to be obtained, it can be
argued just as strongly that Lurie will have little impact on the quantity of immunity
grants. Failure to prosecute an admitted criminal seems a greater sacrifice to society than
the relinquishment of the right to revoke a governmental privilege based on the in-
criminating testimony. Thus, in most cases, as long as the evidence is important enough
to warrant this greater sacrifice it would appear that it is also important enough to out-
weigh the additional sacrifice imposed by Lurie.
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the statute. The state will benefit from an increased flow of useful testi-
mony, and the witness from greater protection from governmental
penalties.
Torts-STANDARD OF CARE-PROPERTY OWNER OWEs INVITED LICENSEE
DUTY To DISCOVER AND WARN OF HAzARDous CONDITIONS ON PREM-
IsEs.-Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).
During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Frank Wood family in-
stalled in their front yard an underground bomb shelter that in later
years their teenaged son, Frank Layne Wood, used as his own room.
On October 7, 1969, Randall Camp, a close friend of young Wood,
visited the bomb shelter while Wood was sick in the main house. The
shelter exploded, apparently because a faulty valve had allowed pro-
pane gas to escape and accumulate. Camp suffered severe and extensive
burns, and died five days later. His father, John 0. Camp, brought a
wrongful death action against Mr. Wood and the gas company. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, citing the
limited duty of care a landowner owes to a social guest." The Second
District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded in an opinion which
seemed to reject the traditional categories of invitee, licensee and tres-
passer, and which seemed to hold that a landowner owes all persons
lawfully on his premises the duty of reasonable care under the circum-
stances.2 Wood petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for a writ of
1. Camp v. Gulf Counties Gas Co., 265 So. 2d 730, 731 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
2. Camp v. Gulf Counties Gas Co., 265 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972). The
test applied by Judge Mann, writing for the court, was the test originally used by Lord
Denning in Hawkins v. Caulsdon & Purley Urban Dist. Council, [1954] 1 Q.B. 319, 337
(1953): "The duty is not to invitees as a class, nor to licensees as a class, but to the very
person himself who is lawfully there. What is reasonable care in regard to him depends
on all the circumstances of the case." (Emphasis added.) A close reading of this test sug-
gests that it has no application to trespassers because they are not lawfully on the land.
While it is true that, for tort purposes, trespassers are not always distinguished from
licensees by the fact that they are unlawfully on the land, reference to the Hawkins case
clearly indicates that Lord Denning was not concerned with trespassers when he formu-
lated the test. The Hawkins case involved the licensee-invitee distinction, and it was that
distinction that Lord Denning did "not believe . . . [to be] well-founded." Id. at 30.
The Hawkins case did not consider or affect the trespasser category. It "consider[ed] simply
the law about licensees." id. at 335. Thus it is a mistake to conclude that Lord
(Vol. 2
